digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

6-2014

Law in the Flesh: Tracing Legitimation's Origin to
The Act of Killing?
Richard Sherwin
New York Law School, richard.sherwin@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Recommended Citation
11 NoFo 2014

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Law in the Flesh:Tracing Legitimation’s Origin
to The Act of Killing?
Richard K. Sherwin*

For in the exercise of violence over life and death more than in any other legal act,
law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in law is revealed…
Walter Benjamin
What is at issue here is […] not simply the question of the sources of legitimate
political rule but, more profoundly, our capacity to feel represented in the social field,
to experience those representations as viable facilitations of our vitality.
Eric Santner
The undying spirit of [Natural] Law can never be extinguished.
If it is denied entry into the body of positive law, it flutters about the room like a ghost,
and threatens to turn into a vampire which sucks the blood from the body of Law.
Otto Gierke

A proper respect for civil order does not mandate the elision of political violence. To
the contrary, civility requires that we explore the exercise of violence at the beginning
of state sovereignty. To forget, or repress, originary violence invites its return. That
is why, with its insistence upon rational calculation and the neutralization of desire,
the vast cleanup operation of liberal theory is bound to fail.
The exception proves the rule, and the state of exception, upon which the
one who is sovereign decides (Schmitt 2005, 5), proves the rule of law. The state of
exception is the moment that reveals the true source of state power, the ultimate
source of law. As Schmitt writes: ‘The exception, which is not codified in the existing
* Professor of Law, Director, Visual Persuasion Project, New York Law School.
** I wish to thank Paul Yachnin, Mark Antaki, Virginia Kartini Preston, and Amelia Jones for their generous
collegiality during my residence as Fulbright Canada Research Chair in Law and Literature at McGill’s Institute
for the Public Life of Arts and Ideas in the spring of 2014, and for their stimulating conversations about many
of the ideas discussed in this essay.
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legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the
existence of the state’ (Ibid., 6). By declaring a state of emergency, or by creating one,
the sovereign makes clear where unbound power lies. We cannot but confront this
distasteful insight: confront it, explore it, and judge it—particularly with regard to
the expressive commitment to foundational narratives and symbolic representations
that precedes, and that may or may not emerge from the state of exception. Fidelity
to law, a key component of law’s legitimation (see Hart 1961), originates in, and is
constituted by, such a commitment. It signifies investiture: authorizing state violence
through the convergence of power and meaning, a normative synthesis that aims to
render law’s authority worthy of acceptance.
In the state of exception foundational political meanings often fragment and
grow incoherent. When power and meaning are sundered the ship of state loses
both anchor and compass. Out of the crisis of belief that ensues we encounter an
inexpressible excess, the inchoate source of the state’s political vitality, what Schmitt
calls ‘the power of real life’ (Schmitt 2005, 15), the body politic’s libidinal flame.
Eros is the name we give to the creative force out of which political worlds are
made, out of the political unconscious known as the flesh of the law. Here we find
the originating impulse that is needed to invest in a world of meaning. That force
surges forth in a liminal state, betwixt and between terror and enchantment. It is
then that we ask, what symbolic social bond will be endorsed? What nomos will we
inhabit? What links my body to another: what shared narrative of origin, or what
collective terror?
With the general acceptance of state power as legal authority, based on
uncoerced commitment to binding core values, the specter of violence recedes. The
foundational story of the state takes over. Enchantment ensues. The liminal creature,
in the bare flesh of his or her own being, decides to commit to a world of political
and legal significance.
To invest in a proffered meaning, or not, to decide and to act, or not, culminates
in the challenge of bare life at its most elemental: to be or not? And if it is to be,
how does one acclaim a world of meaning? What does it demand? These questions
coincide with the origin of politics (as the possibility of deciding on the reality of
shared public life) and of sovereignty (as the moment of collective investiture): will
we, and if so, how will we invest the world with meaning? How do we make politics
happen? We witness this political drama in great literature, in the words and actions
of characters like Hamlet and Caliban, and, in a more recent, but eerily similar
vintage, in the words and actions of real world characters, like Anwar Congo, who
appears in Joshua Oppenheimer’s highly unsettling film, The Act of Killing (2012).
These works invite reflection and judgment: What does the inward state of
lived meaning or, if meaning fails, of terror and paralysis, tell us about the outer
state, politics writ large? There is no getting away from this vital link, the capacity
to register the pulsations of law in the flesh both collectively (in the public rite of
investiture) and singly (in the solitary experience of fidelity to what law demands).
Here we discover the vicissitudes of bio-politics.
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In the foundational moment that is the state of exception, creature and
sovereign remain undifferentiated: the reality of the one still depends upon the
reality of the other. The fabric of being has yet to be woven. When that signification
coheres the metaphysics of its world may be known (Schmitt 2005, 46). Metaphysics,
understood here as the shared understanding of a newly emergent reality, is the
offshoot of collective libidinal investment. We find the hidden poetic structure of the
symbolic world in which we live by following the paths love travels.
Withdrawal of love from the world, the de-cathexis of libido that cast Freud’s
famous patient, Daniel Paul Schreber, the Saxon jurist, into a state of wild psychosis,
is a form of destruction (of self and external reality). Writing about his descent into
psychosis, Schreber described how he felt his body as rotting flesh. It is a story of
unbearable excess—the mute trauma of the body in pain, a state in which one may
be certain, but only of suffering. As Freud said of Schreber: ‘The end of the world is
the projection of [Schreber’s] internal catastrophe. His subjective world has come to
an end since his withdrawal of love from it’ (Santner 2011, 22). This withdrawal of
love, the process of retracting libido from the world, de-animates reality, emptying it
of significance. In legal terms, we might call this ‘dis-investiture’. It is enacted in the
political dramas of dethronement (as in the beheading of Charles I) and revolution.
Investment of love in the world, commitment to its gifts and demands in the
overflow of excess desire, creates an erotic bond out of which political life begins.
The social contract arises from, and is sealed by law in the flesh. ‘The sacral soma’,
Eric Santner calls it (Ibid., xv). It is this ‘sublime substance’ that constitutes the King’s
(second, or) transcendent body and, in the transition to modernity, from monarchy
to popular sovereignty, it is this excess, this overflow of vitality, that the people inherit,
and that sacralizes the people’s transcendent body. The political event out of which
sovereignty and law first emerge coincides with the birth of wild meaning—from out
of the state of exception, when all is in flux and the mind gapes in fear and wonder,
when beings are named as if for the first time, as if language and being were one, as
if words were the very voice of what is (see Merleau-Ponty 1968, 155). That is when
legal symbols and representations become real enough to live by, to bind the popular
will, and warrant fidelity to law.
Legal theorists argue about fidelity to law. As the old positivist/natural law
debate puts it: once you have a valid legal system does content matter? Must law be
moral? (See Fuller 1958). If law is law simply by fulfilling the criteria for validity, isn’t
state power always already authorized by definition? But if that is so, if legitimacy
 Julia Lupton’s description of the character Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest conveys the sense of ‘creature’
I wish to express here, namely: an abject, thing-like being, of passionate passivity, who is also ‘a remnant of
the divine Logos in the process of still becoming’ (Lupton 2005, 161). The creature is both resentful (of an
external subjugating power) and filled with wonder (gripped by a different source of power that he senses
within himself as a dreamlike possibility) (Ibid., 171). This tension reflects the Benjaminian sense of the
creaturely as a quintessential aspect of the baroque soul: at once ‘sullen angel’ and ‘pensive dog’ (Ibid. 163-4).
In one sense, the creature is the sovereign’s creation; in another, it is the other way around. This restates the
state of exception as a condition of the political event out of which new syntheses of power and meaning (new
legal worlds) may emerge.
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requires no more than validity, then legitimacy may come from the barrel of a gun,
with the state acting as the gunman writ large. Requiring fidelity to law as a necessary
element of legitimacy, beyond simply fulfilling the criteria for law’s validity as law,
overcomes the moral dilemma posed by recognizing all valid law as legitimate—
even if it is based on terror or coercion. Requiring acceptance of law’s authority as a
necessary component of legitimacy (see Hart 1961), particularly popular acceptance
(see Sherwin 1986), raises the question: Does the rule of law warrant obedience? Is
it right to obey? In this sense, investiture, the public ceremony of investing power
with meaning, signals a collective acclamation (see Agamben 2011): it is good and
right to obey the sovereign.
But have you ever wondered what is it that makes a particular symbolic order
(such as law) feel right? Have you wondered by what process a world of synthetic
meaning acquires the characteristics of reality? (Santner 2011, xvi). How is it that a
second-order reality, the created worlds of ideas and principles, symbols and norms,
becomes the home we live in, our invisible ‘second’ nature?
To understand, and, yes, ultimately to revitalize, the act of investiture, to reenact our investment in the founding political event, whose legacy we carry like a
home on our backs, it is to the original scene of the political event—acclaiming the
normalization of state violence (as ‘legitimate’)—that we must return, to explore,
theorize, and judge. We do so as a prelude, most necessary, to taking responsibility
for state power as legitimate authority, to re-acclaim our fidelity to law by way of the
foundational, and subsequently ritualized, performance of investiture.
We risk this return to the scene of political and legal origin, of law in the flesh,
because theorizing without the flesh, absent the originary violence and creative
excess of desire, falsifies political and legal reality. It is like dancing without a dancer,
like imagining law without the humanities, like aspiring to become a machine. The
political event cannot begin, or even appear to theory as such, without confronting
the primal scene of political violence and unstable desire. It is the very scene from
which enchantment arises—responding to the call of the world and others to invest
Being in beings on the public stage of politics. Here is the original erotic bond, the
covenant that constitutes our investment in, and commitment to, a world of shared
meaning.
Fleshless, neutered theory, including the liberal-democratic theory of popular
sovereignty, cannot fully succeed because it cannot account for the way states begin
and end in history (investiture and dis-investiture), nor can it account for the
libidinal source (in whatever sublimated form it may take) that drives and sustains
fidelity to law. When the power of acclamation, in the committed practice of fidelity
to law, fades into the perfect administrative state (in which ‘things administer
themselves’ (Schmitt 2004, 5)) re-acclamation beckons. Failing that, the lingering
sense of something rotten at the heart of the state persists. This is the way to Beckett’s
Endgame: in the kingdom of the undead, endless bare life in a perpetual state of
 As pop artist Andy Warhol succinctly put it: ‘Everybody should be a machine’ (Warhol 1963, 116).
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emergency. In short, political catastrophe.
Law on autopilot, like law as the sovereign’s naked command, reveals a condition
Gersholm Scholem hauntingly described as validity without significance (Scholem
1992, 142). This is Kafka’s law: the functional mechanics of power without meaning
or belief. In such systems, subjects are acted upon; they do not decide. They do not
help to perform political or legal reality. Agency gives way to restless stasis. Restless
stasis—Hamlet’s state, a condition of intense distraction perpetuating indecision
and paralysis of action—not a bad image for the predominant mood of baroque
culture, including the neo- (or digital) baroque culture in which we live now, a
state of affairs in which representational forms proliferate wildly, online and in
court. Rules, policies, principles, regulations abound, a profusion of legal forms and
representations whose chief merit is that they maintain the status quo. It is enough, it
would seem, simply to surf the surfaces of form on the surface of the media that host
them. It passes the time while we run in place. What could fidelity to law possibly
mean under such baroque conditions? That, in a nutshell, is the challenge we face.
Political urgency intensifies when the most significant decisions have to be
made and dispositive actions immediately undertaken. Like when the legitimacy of
the state falls under a cloud. It is precisely this crisis of legitimation that Hamlet faces
when the ghost of the recently dead king, Hamlet’s father, appears to him, seeking
rectification for regicide. The king’s brother, Claudius, has usurped the throne and
defiled royal investiture by murdering the rightful king, the specter announces. The
state has grown rotten with illegitimate rule. And so a state of emergency exists,
beginning in Hamlet’s mind, then infecting the entire kingdom, once Hamlet is able
to declare it, and take the required action, in blood. Which is to say, once Hamlet is
able to find the resources to convert his state of restless stasis into violent political
action.
It is then that the play becomes the thing—to make something happen, to shift
 Both seventeenth century baroque and contemporary neo-baroque culture show signs of a state of emergency
in the soul that reigns in parallel with the political state of emergency without.
I have written elsewhere about the baroque condition as follows:
Creation without grace assumed a ghostly appearance. As in a dream, discrete fragments piled
up, concatenating on a landscape of ruin. And as yearning heightened, seeking escape from the
corrupted state of worldly affairs, aesthetic forms proliferated. It was as if the desperate reaching out
toward a distant heaven, as if to outrun an encroaching darkness, could only express itself in further
decorative embellishments, like infinite folds within a compressed, but seemingly infinite, translunary
space. In an effort to stave off the uncanny monstrousness of empty form, to tamp down the fear
of Nothing, what Lyotard has aptly described as the fear of the non-occurrence of the event, the
baroque imagination can only make more of the same, as if only this colossal profusion of expressive
form could avert catastrophe. And so, like arabesques endlessly improvising their monadic design,
baroque ornamentation proliferated. Dizzying, decentering, even nauseating in their spatial and visual
onslaught. (Sherwin 2011, 107.)
 This neo-baroque effect is nicely captured in the empty profusion of hyper-brief film fragments that
constitute Christian Marclay’s 24 hour long film work, The Clock. Go to: <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Y8svkK7d7sY> (last visited 6 May 2014). Ryan Trecartin’s pop video images attain a similarly neobaroque, albeit more circus-like effect. For a visual sample, go to: <http://vimeo.com/trecartin> (last visited
6 May 2014).
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the mood from the subjunctive (anxious, thought-heavy dithering) to the imperative
(Claudius must die!). That is the mood shift Hamlet must undergo. But to get there he
first needs to experience what it is like for sovereign and creature to merge, to carry
his country’s fate on his back (Shakespeare, Hamlet I.v.190) whilst being reduced
to flesh (I.ii.129), set naked (IV.vii.44), in a ‘stale, unweeded garden’, (I.ii.133)‘rank
and gross in nature’ (I.ii.136), poised on the edge of the grave (V.i.72), peering in,
to contemplate even the most noble conqueror in history (V.i.195) reduced to dust,
which is to say, divested of sovereign power. Where is the King’s transcendent body
now?
In the end, nothing remains but the legitimating story: how Hamlet has set
things right, in the violent counter-stroke of rectifying regicide, to be recounted in a
story whose very telling restores the vital conditions of legitimacy, including fidelity to
sovereign rule. The very telling, and retelling, of this foundational narrative performs
investiture. It establishes and preserves legitimate authority by the signifying force of
the great beginning-tale of stasis and action, born of bare life, suffused with suffering
and death, containing (even as it performs) the wild meaning of law in the flesh:
Let this same be presently perform’d,
Even while men’s minds are wild; lest more mischance
On plots and errors, happen. (V.ii.377-379.)

No sooner has the elemental political event occurred than it is to be symbolically
re-enacted. The play—this foundational story, originating out of the primal scene
of political violence, illegitimate on the one hand, re-legitimating on the other, this
account that we witness, being performed before us, together with the one nestled
within it (to test the conscience of the illegitimate King), this story of revitalized
investiture which Horatio announces in the end, incarnates a new beginning-tale.
Its public re-telling is now Hamlet’s great legacy, and Horatio’s sole purpose in life: to
explain the prince’s tragic death, how he set Denmark’s affairs aright. The play becomes
the thing that compels judgment in a performance designed to catch the conscience
of the public, perhaps to dispel political stasis writ large, sparking an effort to renew
state legitimacy, while the public’s mind is wild—perhaps even stoking wildness in
the retelling. Having thus brought its public closer to the state of emergency (within
and without), the performative reality of law in the flesh may be grasped anew in its
signifying glory. Grasped—which is to say, simultaneously understood and seized?
As if the invitation to break with political stasis might purge the state of illegitimate
violence even if by means of counter-violence? How subversive to perform Hamlet
 See Hamlet V.i.199-202:
Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to clay,
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away:
O, that that earth, which kept the world in awe,
Should patch a wall to expel the winter flaw!
 As suggestive of the force cultural productions, such as plays and popular films, may have on the political
stage, we may recall the many Occupy Wall Street protesters who wore ‘V for Vendetta’ masks—invoking the
spirit of insurrection that suffuses James McTeigue’s 2005 film of that name (based on a story by Wachowsky



Richard K. Sherwin

NoFo 11 (2014)

in a state that has already begun to fail. Danger remains close when the state of
emergency is evoked. For when the flesh trembles no one can predict what will come
next.
The foundational story simultaneously invests political violence with meaning
while documenting it, serving simultaneously as repertoire and archive, mimesis as
imitation and mimesis as performance (see Spariosu 1985). But in order to perform
the political event, first light and dark must be torn asunder. And the multitude
(whether stationed by the stage of political theater or on the brink of action in the
public square) must behold their heterogeneous power, to appear to themselves in
the mirror of art, theater, dance, or film, as actors on the stage of politics: destroyers
and creators, creatures and sovereigns, at once. Before art’s shimmering mirror we
(as cultural spectators and political subjects alike) shudder, and struggle to decide
whether there is a need to act, and if there is whether we have the resources to
decide, and act correctly. As if the state of exception were always there, waiting to be
proclaimed (and seized) as such, to be remembered in the excess of immanence, in
the overflow of desire, in the political event par excellence, from law in the flesh to
political theater, the public domain of political action, performatively constituting
the people’s second (transcendent) body, even now.
And yet, an ever-protective impulse quickens to drop a veil over such beginnings.
Form conspires to conserve form. The jurisgenerative gives way to the jurispathic:
law founds law, and then kills it, to save itself from change (see Cover 1983).
Is that the pact, the great political contract, the secular covenant that Hobbes
famously held out, as the catastrophic violence of sectarian civil war and plague
swirled around him? Yield up your wild desire in exchange for survival? Sacrifice
its unwieldy excess on the altar of secular conservation; seek hope in stasis? In
Hobbes’ archetypal early modern Liberal blueprint for secular investiture, by
stark contrast to the Elizabethan drama of Hamlet, we witness the state’s sanitized,
siblings).
 As in the epilogue from Shakespeare’s The Tempest, spoken to the audience by Prospero, as he passes on
to them (the sovereign people?) his spell-(un)binding powers, asking that they, by their own breath and
hands, re-enact the play’s restoration of legitimate sovereign authority in the spirit of compassion, mercy, and
love—as if to say, it is the people’s task now to perform their acclamation of, and take direct responsibility for,
legitimacy’s narrative:
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands:
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,
And my ending is despair,
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardon’d be,
Let your indulgence set me free.
 See Lupton 2005, 196 (‘The decision of the judge refers the order of law back to the founding trauma of
creation ex nihilo’).
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‘rational’ beginning, and glimpse how the seeds of its terrifying end may have been
sown. For in the Hobbesian fantasy of origin, composed in the spirit of geometry
and the instrumental triumph of rational calculation, Liberal theory’s foundational
text colludes with a reckoning to come: the price to be paid for violating the reality
principle of desire, for promulgating a positivist (and nominalist) shift from excess
vitality in the event of jurisgenesis to mortification of the flesh behind the mask of
rational necessity.
Where now are the remains of the King’s transcendent body, its modern trace
beyond noble dust, in the political excess of popular sovereignty, that transcendent
investment we carry on our backs if not under our skin?
The flesh waits to convulse again, to rise up from under the deadening load of
formal validity without significance, beyond bare Hobbesian law, beyond the naked
power to enforce commands (Hobbes 1985, 188). Of course, masking the vitality and
dangerous volatility of the flesh behind the undoubtedly more palatable appearance
of cool rational calculation has its merit, along with its distinctive logic.
It was a timely strategy, and a compelling logic: holding out, between the forces
of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, an as yet unsullied third way, a ‘neutral’
science that might rise above the internecine civil warfare sparked by irreconcilable
religious passion. But Hobbes’ rhetorical gambit, successful as it was, is a Faustian
bargain. Its sleight of hand suppression of desire spawned a ghost that haunts the
legal machinery that it helped to build, a ghost that just as surely haunts the founding
texts of liberal theory itself.
The great Liberal cleanup operation begins here, with the neutral logic of
clear and distinct ideas, objective calculation, and rational necessity. Perhaps that
is why Hobbes the rhetorician, the brilliant stylist, obscures his rhetoric, hiding it
in an anti-rhetorical animus that masked the foundational irrationality of pain and
desire, violence and love, in the utterly dispassionate rhetoric of geometry. With but
a handful of natural laws, the human drive to survive chief among them, Hobbes
invokes with cool precision the logic of rational choice. Never mind the rhetorical
power operating behind the scenes, the anti-rhetorical rhetoric that generates
the style of geometric reason in the first place: in Hobbes, the force of rhetorical
seduction lay hidden behind the mask of geometric formality.
The hidden seduction of rhetorical enchantment is desire’s agent. It is a restless
spirit,10 a symptom of dis-ease that is bound to return, to have its tale told anew,
perhaps in order to have its claim set right.
Kant and Rawls were no more able to bury that restless spirit than was H.L.A.
 I am indebted to Mark Antaki of McGill Law School for pressing this idea upon me in the course of
discussions at the ‘Law in the Flesh’ roundtable on April 2, 2014 (sponsored by McGill University’s Institute
for the Public Life of Arts and Ideas).
10 A ‘ghost’ in Hobbes’ own terms:
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed […] call them Ghosts; as the Latines
called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible
Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. (Hobbes
1985, 170-1.)
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Hart, who sought to hide it in his descriptive sociology of positive law’s ‘minimum
conditions of natural law’. Hart, too, wanted to naturalize the prescriptive demands
of valid (positive) law (see Hart 1961),11 to neutralize the frightening mess of desire
that inheres in the original scene of politics. If only we could forget such wild times,
when ‘wild minds’ host wild meanings (Hamlet V.ii.377-379). If only we could hide
the danger of desire’s excess, perhaps behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’, so that
natural necessity, or the cooler logic of disembodied rationality might prevail. But
calculative reason is not what inspires political subjects to become co-makers of
political reality at the risk of pain, imprisonment, exile, or perhaps even death,
whether it is in Tiannemen Square in China, or Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, or Tahrir
Square in Egypt, or the Occupy Wall Street protests that began in Zuccotti Park in
New York and soon spread around the United States and the world. As Emerson
wrote on the eve of America’s great civil war:
Ideas make real societies and states. […] It will always be so. Every principle is
a war-note. Who ever attempts to carry out the rule of right & love & freedom
must take his life in his hand. (Emerson 2010, 726.)

Right, love, freedom: in fidelity to formative ideas such as these even life itself may
not be too high a price to pay. Believe that, and the political event, in the state of
exception, is no abstraction. These foundational ideas (and others besides, ugly as
well as noble) are the vestments of investiture, the expressions of significance that
invest power with meaning. When they are real enough, when the soma shudders
and shakes off the living death of bare life, for love of the world (that one commits
to be in) one realizes: ‘There was never any more inception than there is now’
(Whitman 1982, 190). ‘Urge and urge and urge, Always the procreant urge of the
world’ (Ibid.). Vitality, excess desire, law in the flesh—that is what moves political
subjects to action, to a vital commitment to symbolic forms of expression that
constitute a living nomos.
In the midst of bare life, urgency is all, even if we can never be sure where it will
lead: violence, death, freedom, vassalage, love, destitution. From de Sade to Artaud,
to Von Trier, erotic urgency gambles with death and destruction. History teaches
that politics is hardly immune to the vicissitudes of desire.
Is there, then, no reliable compass to guide us beyond bare life in the state of
exception? It is in search of guidance, in response to this vital question, that we turn
to Joshua Oppenheimer’s extraordinary film, The Act of Killing. In keeping with the
times we live in, Oppenheimer’s film is an appropriately baroque tale, blending genres
(is this a documentary? A drama? A tragedy? Farce?) even as it seamlessly blends
reality and fantasy in its uncanny return to the primal scene of political violence.
The film’s main protagonist is Anwar Congo, a killer, in Indonesia, who served
the needs of state terror in his youth, brazenly, cruelly. A self-described gangster, a
thug, who has modeled his persona on Hollywood killers, dressing like them, raffish,
11 See also Leiter 2007. I take issue with Leiter’s ‘naturalization’ of jurisprudence in Sherwin 2011, 122-49.
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a lady’s man, who learned from the silver screen the art of killing with a strand of
wire, openly praising the efficiency of strangulation, how it avoids the stench and
mess of victims’ blood, although of that, too, he has learned much, while performing
the state’s bidding.
The massacres in Indonesia began in 1965, and continued on through the next
year. Over a million people were killed. No one knows the exact number. It was
said the Communists had masterminded a coup d’état that allegedly began when a
group of military officers belonging to the elite guards of President Sukarno killed
six important generals. To repel the threat, or so he claimed, Major General Suharto,
commander of the army’s elite Strategic Forces, launched a counter-attack. The
mutineers in the army were crushed, and the army-controlled media immediately
began a campaign against the Communists, asserting that they were behind the
attempted coup. Members of the Communist Party and alleged collaborators (which
meant anyone who opposed Suharto’s rise to power) were swept away in a torrent
of violence, targeted for execution. The Indonesian army could not perform all that
killing alone, and so Suharto, who was now calling the shots in Indonesia, recruited
a civilian force, made up of killers like Anwar Congo, who was one of its leaders in
the heyday of the massacres.
It remains unclear whether the Communist threat was real or a pretext used by
Suharto to stage his own coup d’etat to overthrow his predecessor, President Sukarno.
In any event, Suharto’s Indonesian ‘New Order’, aided by its military and civilianmanned machinery of terror and death, not only triumphed over its foes, but also
managed to remain in power for 32 years, from 1966 to 1998.
The official state story of political origin, the foundational narrative of Suharto’s
sovereign rule, was repeatedly rehearsed in an official propaganda film, which the
public, from young to old, was compelled to watch on television and in movie theaters
around the country throughout Suharto’s rule, thus enacting what one might describe
as a coerced ritual of simulated investiture. ‘Simulated’ because coercion compels
only the formal gestures of normative investment, not the authentic acceptance that
comes of freely committed belief.
The images that Indonesians were compelled to watch during the Suharto
regime were meant to foment terror, in the face of a grotesquely violent enemy (the
‘Communists’) and a perhaps even more terrifying state apparatus of organized
violence. Civilian killers like Anwar Congo were depicted as national heroes. Indeed,
more than four decades after having played his part in Suharto’s victory, we see now
(in Oppenheimer’s film) Congo still being celebrated by Indonesian officials. We
also see an organized civilian militia of fascist thugs parading before an adoring
(or are they simply a terrified?) public. Oppenheimer captures some of the current
civilian leaders nonchalantly reminiscing about ‘the good old days’ of 1965, when
rape routinely accompanied the killing.
We also see in Oppenheimer’s film common thugs as they make their rounds
in the marketplace, crudely shaking down (mostly Chinese) merchants for payoffs.
Violence and terror have become routine. One elected official openly recounts
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the names and business ventures of politicians in high places who are on the take:
corruption, bribery, and graft are rampant. The ethos of political decadence is so
normal that one political wannabe, whom we see buffoonishly campaigning among
voters who openly besiege him for larger payoffs in exchange for their vote, describes
his chief political idea as coercing money from merchants by threatening them with
zoning violations.
It is against this backdrop of pervasive corruption and terror that Oppenheimer’s
film unfolds. Its premise may be easily stated, though what ensues is anything
but simple. What would happen, the filmmaker posits, if he gave one of the most
fearsome gangsters from the time of the massacres the technical means to make a
film, to tell his story, any way he wants, about what it was like back then, and how it
feels now, to have participated in the massive killing spree that launched Indonesia’s
‘New Order’?
The Act of Killing is the product of that invitation (though we do not know
the full extent of Oppenheimer’s edits and staging decisions versus those of his
alternate, killer-director Anwar Congo). The images on the screen are simultaneously
fascinating, frightening, bizarrely humorous, canny (reflecting Congo’s grasp of film
aesthetics), bewilderingly surreal, self-lacerating, and almost unbearably poignant.
In the course of the film Congo oscillates between the swaggering bravado
of his youth and (real or perhaps feigned) physical and emotional suffering as the
magnitude of his sins begins to dawn upon him. We learn that Congo’s past acts
haunt him. He cannot sleep, and when he does nightmares descend upon him—
like the recurrent dream in which he sees the severed head of a victim, impulsively
decapitated by Congo with a machete, whose eyes remained open, eyeing its killer
from the ground where it fell. This image, it seems, is too much even for Congo. He
returns obsessively to that scene, wondering at one point why he never bothered to
close those vacantly staring eyes—as if so slight a gesture might have saved Congo
from the suffering that has plagued him since.
In the film, he attempts a number of gambits to ease the weight of oppressive
memory. They span the gamut from ludicrous to horrific. At one point, for example,
Congo stages a bizarre fantasy of redemption—complete with beautiful dancing
girls set against the backdrop of a majestic waterfall, in which one of his victims
respectfully places an ostentatious medal around Congo’s neck as he thanks Congo
for bringing him to heaven. But for the greater part of the film Congo’s fantasies take
a much darker turn, depicting re-enactments of gruesome acts of torture and killing
featuring Congo as the victim. Congo stages his own violent interrogation and death
by strangulation. We also see him buried in the dirt, being fed (and gagging on) what
is supposed to be his own raw liver, presumably ripped from his body, while in yet
another scene we see him lying on the ground beside his own decapitated head.
It does not take much in the way of psychoanalytic speculation to discern here
the return of the repressed, as if these role reversals might somehow purge from
Congo’s tortured mind the pain of such recurrent traumatic memories, to drain
away the haunting violence that roils within him, or at least to find some semblance
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of significance, to assign these recollections a name so that their meaning might be
palpably grasped once and for all, perhaps as the first necessary step toward their
purgation.
But if that is his goal, Congo does not visibly succeed. He remains not purged
but in purgatory, on the bare threshold of insight,12 driven by forces he can neither
name nor understand. How else could he roust from bed his two young grandchildren
to watch some of the preliminary images that Oppenheimer has provided,
gruesome images of grandpa, hands tied behind his back, his face bloodied, as he
is being brutalized by knife-wielding interrogators? Why is Congo smiling, with his
grandchildren on his knees, coddling them in his arms so close, as he says, ‘See?
Look at grandpa, how he’s being tortured by that fat guy […]’. What does he expect
from these innocent children who seem so dear to him, that they might watch and
understand his confession to them? That these young innocents (perhaps they alone,
since they alone might embody the last remains of Congo’s capacity for love) are still
invested with the curative power, love’s privilege, to forgive their grandpa for the evil
he has committed? Though surely they are hardly old enough to comprehend much
less forgive what they see on the screen before them. Such is Congo’s confused and
destitute state.
Amidst the fantasies, the mystifications, and gross self-deceptions, however,
images of a reckoning of sorts also emerge. As in the film’s final scene in which a
physically frail, white-haired Congo returns to the rooftop where so many of his
victims were tortured and killed. It is nighttime, and Congo paces the roof top in
silence, pausing to gag, again and again, his body repeatedly wracked by dry heaves,
from deep within. Heaving, as if to purge himself of an unnamed suffering, Congo
only underscores his emptiness, for nothing comes of the act. He is already empty.
Repulsed, the viewer might well think, yes, this is bare life. The purgatory in which
Congo dwells cannot be dispelled. He remains in exile, a liminal creature in the grip
of ghosts from his past, the victims who leave him no rest. Or so we may be led to
imagine.
To be sure, there is nothing redemptive about this final scene. Justice remains
far off. The perpetrators of terror are still free and remain unpunished (see Meister
2012). The victors remain in power, and many still enjoy the material rewards
and even the public adulation (though most likely feigned) of their past deeds as
gangsters. For his part, Anwar Congo has barely begun to articulate the full extent
of his crimes, nor do we know if he ever will assume full responsibility, or seek
forgiveness. No, there is nothing redemptive here, but that is not to say Oppenheimer
has not achieved something remarkable, something altogether unparalleled in the
history of cinema, testing its boundaries—the lines between memory and fantasy,
truth and fiction, politics and spectacle.
If we acknowledge there is such a thing as the political unconscious, what I
12 ‘Maybe I sinned, Joshua?’ Congo says at one point to an off-screen Oppenheimer, as if, notwithstanding the
incredible insouciance of his tone, after having repeatedly replayed his acts of torture and killing, admittedly
undertaken hundreds of times with innocent victims, any doubt about the matter could remain.
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have been referring to as the primal scene of political violence, or law in the flesh, I
would say Oppenheimer takes us uncannily close. Under the skin of Anwar Congo
we glimpse the usually hidden, liminal, even taboo site of origin (and end) for
sovereign states, which is also to say, the stage upon which law’s beginning and end are
performed and judged. In the person of Anwar Congo we witness the quintessential
creature of political terror: at once the maker (as agent of state violence) and the one
who (as abject subject) is made (by internalizing state violence shorn of meaning).
Anwar Congo is Hamlet bereft of the cultural and psychological resources needed to
become anew—to escape the intensity of his paralysis in the face of injustice. Here is
a living image of law in the flesh suited to a failed political state under neo-baroque
conditions: mute, heaving, destitute, empty. In short, Congo remains trapped in a
perpetual state of emergency. No matter how many representational forms or visual
images may be placed at his disposal the result remains the same. Endgame. Political
and psychological catastrophe.
In baroque and neo-baroque states, laws (like all baroque representational forms)
proliferate, but their formal validity cannot provide the normative significance that
legitimation requires. The intensity of their endless production (and reproduction)
may distract us from the emptiness at their core, but this is only a delaying tactic.13
Fleeting intensities may postpone but they cannot avert collapse into mute terror in
the baroque process of evacuation that Walter Benjamin described as ‘clean[ing] an
ultimate heaven, [and] enabling it, as a vacuum, one day to destroy the world with
catastrophic violence’ (Benjamin 1998, 66).
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt 2005, 5). So begins Carl
Schmitt’s Political Theology. Here is an addendum. Declaring the state of exception
may pinpoint the source of state power, but its true origin precedes and may yet
overtake it. The zero time of the political event, the big bang—that incoherent
convulsion of violence, like the body in pain—is the moment when worlds, and the
symbolic representations they are made of, may or may not come into being. This is
when law in the flesh trembles and asserts itself anew.
The body in pain, mutely closed in on itself, struggles to move beyond violence,
beyond wordless pain, to something formative. Here is the genealogy of law in the
flesh. In the moment after the big bang of political violence, longing begins. Longing
to close the wound of traumatic violence, to overcome the lack of form, the refusal
to signify.
To have pain is to have certainty, according to Elaine Scarry (Scarry 1985,
13). And certainty is most coveted in times of crisis, when belief in symbolic forms
contracts to the vanishing point. That is when violence, as origin, comes into its own.
We recognize it (from Hamlet and from Anwar Congo) as the state of emergency
within.
That violence, that pain, may be ‘appropriated away from the body’, as Scarry
13 It is the same logic of diversion that generates the need for enemies of the state in order to distort, or conceal
altogether our responsibility for violence by directing responsibility outward through collective fantasies of
the hated Other (Žižek 1995, 1529-30).
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puts it (Ibid., 13). Its certainty may be invested in a symbolic form. Violence and pain
bring a feeling of realness to world making, a living vitality, out of the animation of
the flesh. Law originates with these worlds. Law empowers their creation and seeks
to guarantee their continuity—to the extent that the fleshly bond of fidelity to law
persists.
Law quickens in the political unconscious. But longing is anterior to form,
including forms of law. The expressive forms that longing inspires can never master
their source. It is that inexpressible excess which we experience as a lack, to which
we return in the crisis of belief, and the contraction of symbolic forms that such a
crisis entails, perhaps to form’s political and legal vanishing point.
Anwar Congo’s story is the story of that descent into violence and its aftermath.
Without love, and its chief agent, which is justice,14 to re-invest desire in the world,
or in the self for that matter, nothing coheres, nothing flourishes. This is bare life, a
restless stasis that will not resolve.
The flourishing of the Liberal state, and of the psyche that suits it, requires
love because love is stronger than fear, stronger than death, stronger than the
Hobbesian state could ever allow. Hobbes cannot go beyond fear, but fear cannot
build a sustainable future. Love, on the other hand, is beholden to futurity, as it is to
otherness; fear retracts from both. The legal machinery of Hobbes’ Leviathan, in its
effort to overcome the fear of death, mortifies the flesh of the law, repressing violence
and desire behind a veil of rational necessity. That blow against desire paradoxically
fashions political subjects in the image of the living dead, the image of their fear, as
creatures who face a perpetual state of emergency under conditions of bare life.15
In confronting violence and terror, love seeks to exorcise the ghost that haunts
the Hobbesian legal machine, a legal system that is valid but lacks significance. It
is not enough to bind the body politic by fear. Fear may prompt obedience, even
acquiescence, but it will never inspire love, or fidelity. Which is why legal validity
standing alone is bound to decay, to fall back into the nothingness of bare life. That is
the ‘ontological vulnerability’ (Santner 2011, 6) of the Liberal state devoid of flesh.
Terror provokes form and intensity, in excess, to disguise the emptiness at
its core. This is the tell-tale sign of the baroque (Benjamin 1978, 286), including
contemporary neo-baroque cultural and legal representations (see Sherwin 2011).
Baroque social constructions stake their survival on form-as-distraction, but
distraction will not hold in times of crisis. Only love willingly binds, only love will
sacrifice the immediate for the future’s sake.
The political challenge par excellence is to continually seek to renew the binding
power of foundational narratives. Optimally, at least according to the aspirations of
14 For a recent exploration of this idea, see Nussbaum 2013, 15 (‘[A]ll of the core emotions that sustain a
decent society have their roots in, or are forms of love….[Love] is what gives respect for humanity its life’.).
15 The image of the living dead speaks to the accuracy of the original Egerton frontispiece from Hobbes’
Leviathan (which appeared in the manuscript, but was abandoned in the published version) depicting the
monstrous Leviathan made up of skulls that ghoulishly peer out from the regal body. (See Goodrich 2014,
119.)
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liberal democratic states, this means using power to check power, for freedom’s sake,
for the sake of diversity in plurality, and autonomy among equals, so that conditions
hospitable to love may prevail, conditions that nourish the political subject’s free
investment in the binding force of law so that fidelity to law, as the promise of justice,
may persist. This is what it means to cast hope in the form of redemptive justice: love
as fidelity to a perfectable future.
Turning away from suffering, pain, and death will avail nothing on the path to
justice. Fidelity to redemptive possibility requires just the reverse, namely: the will to
test the vitality of extant foundational narratives against the conditions of their birth
in order to risk judgment, and the actions that judgment compels.
There is no vision, no future, in jurispathic stasis. In this sense, the Hobbesian
promise of ‘survival’ posits a false hope. Vitality potentiates hope in the flesh as
the currency of fidelity and the price of legitimation. The sovereign’s two bodies,
from Kingship to multitude, capture our oscillation between fear and love, power
and meaning, jurispathic stasis and jurisgenerative vision, legal validity and the
promise of redemptive justice. Bare life in the state of exception exposes the original
condition, in all its violence and danger, from which the political event springs. To
risk that knowledge, and the responsibility it generates, is to expose fidelity’s true
worth, and the price that must be paid for it, for ultimately, fidelity to law must be
staked in blood.
Here the spirit of the law is laid bare along with the process that binds us to it.
It reflects a people’s collective capacity for transcendence, not to deny violence, but
to acknowledge and struggle to overcome it (see Girard 1987; Santner 2005,102-3).
Under baroque and neo-baroque conditions, which coincide with the collapse
of symbolization, in a time when transcendental references seem all but obsolete,
reflections upon bare life and states of emergency naturally arise. They are what
baroque and neo-baroque cultures are all about, symptomatically speaking.
Signification marks, even as it constitutes, our bond to the world. The body
expressively projects aspects of itself into the world, animating it with meaning.
But sometimes that capacity fails. We experience that want as longing. The lack in
the world is the flesh echoing back to us its incapacity to signify. Fidelity to law,
legitimate authority, depends on regaining the capacity to reinvest this drive (the
excess immanence of desire) back into the world. This, typically, is what poets are
for: to make possible by naming (or renaming) that investment or (in politicojurisprudential terms) that investiture which gives rise to the nomos we live in.
Being without love is destitution, exile, worldlessness. Anwar Congo takes us
there. His dry heaves at the end of The Act of Killing personify the effort to evacuate
world loss. It avails nothing, as we see, since the means of expressive re-cathexis are
lacking. This inchoate state brings Congo in touch with a tear in the fabric of being,
a state prior to political and psychic order. To extrapolate from that experience, to
construe it as a state of bare life writ large, is to ask: Is this the legacy of the founding
terror that lies at the rotten core of Indonesian sovereignty? A warning for other
states, other political subjects? An invitation to ponder what would it take for a
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nation, a sovereign people, to extricate itself from perpetual terror, or the threat of
its imminence?
Here, then, is the decisive moment, the compass point, just after the big bang
of convulsive violence when we ask: to what network of meaning will the urge to
transcend the originary lack attach? What form of meaning (if any) will it animate?
How will the body in pain signify? Or will it?
There is no meaning, no future, in violence without love. Absent the bonding
power of love we lack that which binds us to others, to ideas, narratives, and
institutions, and, above all, to the future.
Here is law in the flesh: seething, trapped within itself, heaving, gripped by the
pain of a great wound, the wound of unsignifying violence and terror. And here, too,
is political ontology as symptom formation. Here is the lack, the urgent longing that
sets the political unconscious in motion. Here we meet the most decisive question,
the one we do not hear from Carl Schmitt, or from Heidegger for that matter. It is
the ethical question par excellence: What will law in the flesh make of otherness: the
otherness of sovereignty, the otherness of law, the otherness of the subject?
When power is homologous to the subject’s will, it is perceived as efficacious.
When power confronts heterogeneous subjects as an Other, it is perceived as the great
master. Friend or enemy? So we ask: what is Otherness to power within sovereignty
(in the language of power’s exchange) and what is Otherness without (the subject’s
power that is either served or thwarted)?
From the King’s two bodies (from the secular corporeal one, and the one that
exceeds corporeal immanence, that transcends the material body) to the secular
modern emergence of what Santner calls the People’s two bodies, sovereignty bears
the phantasmic traces of its origin: the lack, the originary trauma of violence, and
the ensuing drive to heal the wound of finite being.
And so we ask, what are our cultural resources today for expressive significance,
for investiture, for fidelity to law? For example, do Americans still hear its national
vitality resound, say, in Walt Whitman’s songs celebrating the ideal of popular
sovereignty, in fraternal love for the democratic multitude? Songs like Starting from
Paumnok, in which Whitman (1982, 179) writes:
And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality,
For I think I shall then supply myself with the poems of my soul and of
immortality,
I will make a song for these States that no one State may
Under any circumstances be subject to another State…
I will sing the song of companionship,
I will show what alone must finally compact these,
I believe these are to found their own ideal of manly love…
I will write the evangel-poem of comrades and of love…
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Here is Eros springing forth, even from the political unconscious, seeking attachment
in the multitude.
Of course Eros need not express itself as love. It doesn’t do so in the pornographic
imagination of de Sade, for example, or more recently in Lars Von Trier’s film work,
such as his recent Nymphomania (Parts I & II). There the conflation of flesh and
animal life culminates in undifferentiated materiality. This is Deleuzian immanence
and the baroque logic of sensation as pantheistic animality, Eros as the longing to
shatter the bond of form that constrains it. As in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, when
we witness the longing to dissolve, like the spirit, Ariel, into the air or, more to our
purpose, like the witch Sycorax dissolving back into the earth, for that is the secret
wish of the pornographic imagination.
This is Deleuze’s great desire, to give up our creaturely nature by dissolving
it into the pulse of the universe (Santner 2011, 136). Here is Eros mutating into
Thanatos.
From the imagination comes the power to make images, to project the workings
of the mind outward in a physical, active form, to actualize ideas, to conceive
actions, to construct a world, a nomos, to which we are bonded. We encounter this
in the Elizabethan staging of power and sovereignty, against the backdrop of violent
usurpation, in baroque masques that perform the will of the King, mirroring his
mind. As Stephen Orgel puts it: ‘Imagination here is real power: to rule, to control
and order the world, to subdue other men’ (Orgel 1975, 47).
Power to order the world—but on what basis, and to what end? Is it the
absolutizing force of fear, as in Hobbes’ Leviathan? The sado-masochistic imagination
of terror, as in the obscene violence (see Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo 2012) of
Suharto’s and Anwar Congo’s Indonesia? Or is it the spirit of popular sovereignty, as
in Whitman’s Eros of companionship and the heterogeneous yet equal freedom of
the multitude?
What Oppenheimer has left us with is a genealogy of the political unconscious.
Reliving Anwar Congo’s fantasies and terrors, identifying with the heaving body in
pain, we revert to the state of exception. Here is the perennial origin point for all
political creation: law in the flesh, when one regime comes to an end, and another
one rises. This is the time when the flesh of the law, in its uncanny excess, is poised
to project its vitality into some symbolic representation. This is the time of world
making, or not, if like Daniel Paul Schreber or Anwar Congo, love is withdrawn
from the world.
If there is to be a world, there must be a symbolic form to constitute and
contain it. A political narrative must follow forth, but a narrative that will always
bear the mark of its traumatic birth, the unutterable lack that drives and animates it.
As Martha Nussbaum suggests, the emotions that shape and inform that narrative
will also constitute its nature.16
16 See Nussbaum 2013 (though, in the end, her modernist, neo-Kantian mindset, in alliance with abstract
Rawlsian principles, may outstrip her grasp of law in the flesh, with its unpredictable danger, manifest in the
excess desire of bare life in the state of exception).
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Will it be the Hobbesian fear of death? The gangster’s disgust for the Other?
Whitman’s fraternal love for the multitude? Nussbaum’s aspiration to justice as
love’s agent? We do not know. But regardless of the social and political meaning
it contains, there is one bond, the strongest of all social and political forces upon
which meaning can rely, and that is the bond of love. As Giambattista Vico wrote:
‘The soul of man must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love, for once
it loves it is easily taught to believe. Once it believes and loves, the fire of passion
must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to will’ (Vico 1990, 38).
To will that the conditions of civility be preserved, not just peace, but the capacity to
flourish, which is to say, to will the conditions necessary for meaningful freedom we
willingly submit to the bondage of love, the love that binds us to what is other (while
preserving it), an act that in thus limiting our power constitutes a world, a multitude,
and a future.
Eros is the name we give to the creative force out of which political worlds
are made, from bare life, out of the political unconscious known as the flesh of the
law. Political states begin in an excess of desire, an explosion of violence and death.
For what is desire if not the unthinking impulse to fill the non-signifying void of
mortality?
Is it our denial of that stark reality that causes ‘a sacred veil’ to be drawn over
the beginnings of all governments (Strauss 1965, 310), from Rawls’s veil of ignorance,
with which he seeks to neutralize (or perhaps ‘neuter’) liberal theory, to the antirhetorical veil of ‘rational choice’ with which Hobbes seeks to hide the binding force
of desire? No matter. Law in the flesh will tear away that veil when the tension of
restless desire reaches its limit.
Then the play becomes the thing, compelling judgment and action, forcing the
ultimate political question: what counter-factual reality must we animate now to
dispel restless stasis and realize the future we desire? Thus does the prospect
of redemptive justice, in love’s name, continue to haunt the legal and political
imagination.

Epilogue: but will love triumph over catastrophe?
Terror has no future, only perhaps an intensified now. But what constitutes that
‘now’? The right of enjoyment (and what is that if not a milder form of the will to
power aspiring to the same forever)? The right of orthodoxy (and what is that if not
the positing of a timeless now that dissolves temporality itself in the form of some
supreme metaphysical principle)? Or might it be understood in terms of love, as an
aspirational ideal, as our commitment to a future on loan from our children (Dupuy
2013, 62)? These possibilities, among others to be sure, constitute what might be
described as the post-secular condition of contemporary neo-baroque politics and
law (see Lupton 2000, 23; Santner 2005, 133; Sherwin 2011).
Global catastrophe, the likes of which we have never known before, manifest in
the spiraling danger of climate change, may force our hand in this matter (see Latour
2013a; Dupuy 2013, 18, 47). Decisions must be made. Do we choose the immediacy
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of survival now, at all costs, even at the cost of futurity? That is the state of emergency
in which we live today.
Merleau-Ponty, an early explorer in the realm of the flesh, called flesh an
element of Being: ‘not matter, not mind, not substance’ but a ‘general manner of
being’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 139). He attributed to the flesh that which ‘makes the
facts have meaning’ (Ibid., 140). In the flesh we are ‘caught up’ with other beings, in
an experience of ‘co-radiance’, the visible relating to itself (‘animating other bodies as
well as my own’).
This kind of experiential approach, so brilliantly practiced by the great
pragmatist William James, is far from exhausted. To the contrary, it is precisely what
is needed to animate and ground anew the different ontologies that may be linked to
disparate political and jurisprudential values (see Latour 2013b). Likewise, exploring
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘cohesion without concept’ may prove to be of particular
worth in addressing the challenge of law’s binding power as it emerges from the state
of exception. Standing alone, disembodied conceptual ideals, descriptive categories
and typologies, and the cramped behavioral models used to configure rational choice,
cannot adequately capture the way political beliefs are formed and sustained (or fail)
in practice. In this respect, experience, desire and affect have yet to be adequately
tapped as resources for understanding fidelity to law in the legitimation process. It is
here that we encounter the original ground of wild meaning—the conditions under
which political meaning is born anew (as ‘an expression of experience by experience’
(Ibid., 155)).
The pulse of the flesh may be taken in the emanations of political and legal
perturbation—protests, occupations, signs in popular culture of shared anxiety or
shame or anger. These signs point to something deeper, something that the state of
emergency exposes: bare life. Here we glimpse the conditions that constitute sovereign
power, and the significance we assign to it. Agamben refers to our affirmation of that
significance as ‘acclamation’, though he acknowledges the extent to which public acts
of assent (in apparent fidelity to law) may be subject to manipulation, particularly in
the hands of those who control the operation of mass media,17 or outright coercion,
as occurred under Suharto in Indonesia (and continues to occur in authoritarian
states around the world).
Yet, if Merleau-Ponty’s insight into the nature of flesh as a manner of being
in the world is right, its authentic co-radiance with other beings will signify actual
states of affairs, prompting some to utter (as the ghost of Hamlet’s father prompted
Hamlet to say): ‘This bodes some strange eruption to our state’ (I.i.69). Or as Otto
Gierke expressed it: ‘The undying spirit of [Natural] Law can never be extinguished.
If it is denied entry into the body of positive law, it flutters about the room like a
ghost’ (Gierke 1957, 226).
If contemporary neo-baroque cultural conditions implicate post-secular
possibilities, we will need new interpretive and critical methods and new
17 In 1940, the German Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, stated: ‘We must give film a task and a
mission in order that we may use it to conquer the world’ (Rentschler 1996, 215).
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interdisciplinary alliances to explore their meaning and their scope in regard to
contemporary politics and law. Phenomenology, psycho-theology, political theology,
visual jurisprudence—these are just some of the emerging categories (or perhaps reemergent fields) that present themselves to us for further consideration.
The founding moment of political and legal investiture haunts the baroque
and neo-baroque mind, from Hamlet to The Act of Killing. In the former, Prince
Hamlet finds the resources to decide, and to act, in the face of injustice; in so doing
he precipitates a transformative political event that renews the rightful basis for state
legitimacy. In The Act of Killing, by contrast, restless stasis remains unaltered from
beginning to end. It is a state of affairs well suited to neo-baroque conditions—a time of
distracted paralysis, when the availability of the cultural and psychological resources
needed to go beyond terror and its purgatorial aftermath remains uncertain.
The massive cleanup operation of liberal theory will continue to falter, and
will ultimately collapse under the weight of law in the flesh in the state of exception,
unless it is shored up with new methods of assessment along with new sources of
experience. What is rotten in the heart of the state will not go away. It is invulnerable to
the sword (Hamlet I.i.144-146). But it may yield its secrets to a braver mindfulness.
Absent such a re-invigorated interpretive approach, informed by the
epistemology of flesh and the ontology of collective political life, the reflective
practice of assessment and prescription cannot productively proceed. It is difficult
to say how we will fare under current neo- (or digital) baroque conditions. But what
remains certain is that political and legal perturbations will continue; the flesh will
tremble anew. Wild meanings will shake the status quo: more signs of the ghost in
law’s machine.
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